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Abstract—Propositional bounded model checking has been
applied successfully to verify embedded software but is limited
by the increasing propositional formula size and the loss of
structure during the translation. These limitations can be
reduced by encoding word-level information in theories richer
than propositional logic and using SMT solvers for the gener-
ated veriﬁcation conditions. Here, we investigate the application
of different SMT solvers to the veriﬁcation of embedded soft-
ware written in ANSI-C. We have extended the encodings from
previous SMT-based bounded model checkers to provide more
accurate support for variables of ﬁnite bit width, bit-vector
operations, arrays, structures, unions and pointers. We have
integrated the CVC3, Boolector, and Z3 solvers with the CBMC
front-end and evaluated them using both standard software
model checking benchmarks and typical embedded software
applications from telecommunications, control systems, and
medical devices. The experiments show that our approach
can analyze larger problems and substantially reduce the
veriﬁcation time.
Keywords-Bounded Model Checking; Satisﬁability Modulo
Theories; Embedded ANSI-C Software;
I. INTRODUCTION
Bounded Model Checking (BMC) based on Boolean
Satisﬁability (SAT) has been introduced as a complemen-
tary technique to Binary Decision Diagrams (BDD’s) for
alleviating the state explosion problem [1]. The basic idea
of BMC is to check (the negation of) a given property
at a given depth: given a transition system M, a property
φ, and a bound k, BMC unrolls the system k times and
translates it into a veriﬁcation condition ψ such that ψ is
satisﬁable if and only if φ has a counterexample of depth
less than or equal to k. Standard SAT checkers can be used
to check if ψ is satisﬁable. In order to cope with increasing
system complexity, SMT (Satisﬁability Modulo Theories)
solvers can be used as back-ends for solving the veriﬁcation
conditions generated from the BMC instances [2], [3], [4],
[5]. In SMT, predicates from various (decidable) theories are
not encoded by propositional variables as in SAT, but remain
in the problem formulation. These theories are handled by
dedicated decision procedures. Thus, in SMT-based BMC,
ψ is a quantiﬁer-free formula in a decidable subset of ﬁrst-
order logic which is then checked for satisﬁability by an
SMT solver.
In order to reason about embedded software accurately,
an SMT-based BMC must consider a number of issues
that are not easily mapped into the theories supported by
SMT solvers. In previous work on SMT-based BMC for
software [2], [3], [5] only the theories of uninterpreted
functions, arrays and linear arithmetic were considered,
but no encoding was provided for ANSI-C [7] constructs
such as bit operations, ﬂoating-point arithmetic, pointers
(e.g., pointer arithmetic and comparisons) and unions. This
limits its usefulness for analyzing and verifying embedded
software written in ANSI-C. In addition to that, the SMT-
based BMC approach proposed by Armando et al. [2], [5]
does not support the checking of arithmetic overﬂow and
does not make use of high-level information to simplify the
unrolled formula. We address these limitations by exploiting
the different background theories of SMT solvers to build
an SMT-based BMC tool that precisely translates program
expressions into quantiﬁer-free formulae and applies a set of
optimization techniques to prevent overburdening the solver.
This way we achieve signiﬁcant performance improvements
over SAT-based BMC and previous work on SMT-based
BMC.
This work makes two major novel contributions. First, we
provide details of an accurate translation from ANSI-C pro-
grams into quantiﬁer-free formulae. Second, we demonstrate
that the new approach improves the performance of software
model checking for a wide range of embedded software
systems. Additionally, we show that our encoding allows us
to reason about arithmetic overﬂow and to verify programs
that make use of bit-level, pointers, unions and ﬂoating-point
arithmetic. We also use three different SMT solvers (CVC3,
Boolector, and Z3) in order to check the effectiveness of
our encoding techniques. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the ﬁrst work that reasons accurately about ANSI-
C constructs commonly found in embedded software and
extensively applies SMT solvers to check the veriﬁcation
conditions emerging from the BMC of embedded software
industrial applications. We describe the ESBMC1 (Efﬁcient
SMT-Based Bounded Model Checker) tool that extends
the C Bounded Model Checker (CBMC) [8] to support
different SMT solvers in the back-end and to make use of
high-level information to simplify and reduce the unrolled
formula size. Experimental results obtained with ESBMC
show that our approach scales signiﬁcantly better than both
the CBMC model checker [8] and SMT-CBMC, a bounded
1Available at http://users.ecs.soton.ac.uk/lcc08r/esbmc/model checker for C programs that is based on the SMT
solvers CVC3 and Yices [2], [5].
II. BACKGROUND
ESBMC uses the front-end of CBMC to generate the
veriﬁcation conditions (VCs) for a given ANSI-C program.
However, instead of passing the VCs to a propositional SAT
solver, we convert them using different background theories
and pass them to an SMT solver. In this section, we describe
the main features of CBMC and present the background
theories used in the rest of the paper.
A. C Bounded Model Checker
CBMC implements BMC for ANSI-C/C++ programs
using SAT solvers [8]. It can process C/C++ code using
the goto-cc tool [9], which compiles the C/C++ code into
equivalent GOTO-programs using a gcc-compliant style.
Alternatively, CBMC uses its own, internal parser based
on Flex/Bison, to process the C/C++ ﬁles and to build an
abstract syntax tree (AST). The typechecker annotates this
AST with types and generates a symbol table. CBMC’s
IRep class then converts the annotated AST and the C/C++
GOTO-programs into an internal, language-independent for-
mat used by the remaining phase of the front-end.
CBMC derives the VCs using two recursive functions
that compute the assumptions or constraints (i.e., variable
assignments) and properties (i.e., safety conditions and user-
deﬁned assertions). CBMC’s VC generator (VCG) automat-
ically generates safety conditions that check for arithmetic
overﬂow and underﬂow, array bounds violations, and null-
pointer dereferences. Both functions accumulate the control
ﬂow predicates to each program point and use that to guard
both the constraints and the properties, so that they properly
reﬂect the program’s semantics.
Although CBMC implements several state-of-the-art tech-
niques for propositional BMC, it still has the following
limitations [2], [3]: (i) large data-paths involving complex
expressions lead to large propositional formulae, (ii) high-
level information is lost when the veriﬁcation conditions are
converted into propositional logic, and (iii) the size of the
encoding increases with the size of the arrays used in the
program.
B. Satisﬁability Modulo Theories
SMT decides the satisﬁability of ﬁrst-order formulae using
a combination of different background theories and thus
generalizes propositional satisﬁability by supporting uninter-
preted functions, arithmetic, bit-vectors, tuples, arrays, and
other decidable ﬁrst-order theories. Given a theory T and
a quantiﬁer-free formula ψ, we say that ψ is T -satisﬁable
if and only if there exists a structure that satisﬁes both the
formula and the sentences of T , or equivalently, if T∪ { ψ}
is satisﬁable [6]. Given a set Γ ∪{ ψ} of formulae over T ,
we say that ψ is a T -consequence of Γ, and write Γ |=T ψ,
if and only if every model of T∪ Γ is also a model of
ψ. Checking Γ |=T ψ can be reduced in the usual way to
checking the T -satisﬁability of Γ∪{¬ψ}. SMT solvers are
decision procedures for certain decidable theories.
In our work, the program to be analyzed is essentially
modelled as a state transition system, which is built by ex-
tracting its behavior from the control-ﬂow graph. Formally, a
state transition system, denoted by M, is deﬁned by a triple
(S, T, s0) where S represents the set of states, T ⊆ S × S
represents the set of transitions and s0 ⊆ S represents the set
of initial states. In SMT-based bounded model checking, we
unroll the transition system M and the property ψ (which is
to be checked in T ), yielding Mk and ψk respectively, and
pass these to an SMT solver to check Mk |=T ψk [3]. The
number of loop iterations and recursive calls occurring in the
program is then bounded by the given number k. The solver
will always terminate with a satisﬁable/unsatisﬁable answer.
If the answer is satisﬁable, we have found a violation of the
property ψ. If it is unsatisﬁable, the property ψ holds in M
up to the given bound k.
State-of-the-art SMT solvers support not only the combi-
nation of different decidable theories, but also the integration
of SAT solvers in order to speed up the performance.
Furthermore, they often also integrate a simpliﬁer which
applies standard algebraic reduction rules before bit-blasting
(i.e., replacing the word-level operators by bit-level cir-
cuit equivalents) propositional expressions to a SAT solver.
Background theories vary but the SMT-LIB initiative aims
at establishing a common standard for the speciﬁcation
of background theories [10]. However, most SMT solvers
provide functions in addition to those speciﬁed in the SMT-
LIB. Therefore, we describe here all the fragments that we
found in the SMT solvers CVC3, Boolector and Z3 for the
theory of linear, non-linear, and bit-vector arithmetic [11],
[12], [13]. We summarize the syntax of these background
theories as follows:
Fml ::= Fml con Fml |¬ Fml | Atom
con ::= ∧ |∨|⊕|⇒|⇔
Atom ::= Trm rel Trm | Id | true | false
rel ::= < |≤|> |≥ |= |  =
Trm ::= Trm op Trm | Const | Id | Extracti,j(Trm)
| SignExtk(Trm)| ZeroExtk(Trm)
| ite(Fml, Trm,Trm)
op ::= +o,u |− o,u |∗ o,u | /o | rem
| << | >> | & ||| ⊕ |@
In this grammar Fml denotes Boolean-valued expressions,
Trm denotes terms built over integers, reals, and bit-vectors
while op denotes binary operators. The semantics of the
relational operators (i.e., <, ≤, >, ≥), the non-linear arith-
metic operators (i.e., ∗, /, rem) and the right-shift operator
(>>) depends on whether their arguments are unsigned or
signed bit-vectors, integers or real numbers. The operator
Extracti,j denotes bit-vector extraction from bits i down toj to yield a new bit-vector of size i−j +1while @ denotes
the concatenation of the given bit-vectors. SignExtk extends
the bit-vector to the signed equivalent bit-vector of size
w+k, where w is the original width of the bit-vector, while
ZeroExtk extends the bit-vector with zeros to the unsigned
equivalent bit-vector of size w +k. The conditional expres-
sion ite(f,t1,t 2) takes as ﬁrst argument a Boolean formula
f and depending on its value selects either the second or
the third argument. The indices o and u at the arithmetic
operators indicate overﬂow and underﬂow checking for the
bit-wise addition, subtraction, multiplication and division
operations respectively. As a result, the operators +o,u, −o,u,
∗o,u and /o create additional checks to ensure that the
arithmetic operations do not overﬂow and/or underﬂow. The
operator rem denotes the signed and/or unsigned remainder,
depending on the arguments.
The array theories of SMT solvers are typically based on
the two McCarthy axioms [14]. Let a be an array, i and j be
integers and v be a value. The function select(a,i) denotes the
value of array a at index i and store(a,i,v) denotes an array
that is exactly the same as array a except that the value
at index position i is v (if i is within the array bounds).
Formally, the functions select(a,i) and store(a,i,v) can then
be represented by the following two axioms [11], [12], [13]:
i = j ⇒ select(store(a,i,v),j)=v
i  = j ⇒ select(store(a,i,v),j)=select(a,j)
The ﬁrst axiom asserts that the value selected at index j
is the same as the last value stored to the index i if the
two indices i and j are equal. The second axiom asserts
that storing a value to index i, does not change the value
at index j, if the indices i and j are different. In addition
to that, equality on array elements is deﬁned by the theory
of equality with uninterpreted functions (i.e., a = b ∧ i =
j ⇒ select(a,i)=select(b,j)) and the extensional theory
of arrays then allows reasoning about array comparisons as
follows [11], [12], [13]:
a = b ⇐∀ i · select(a,i)=select(b,i)
a  = b ⇒∃ i · select(a,i)  = select(b,i)
Tuples are used to model the ANSI-C unions and struct
datatypes. They provide store and select operations similar
to those in arrays, but working on the tuple elements. Hence,
the expression select(t, f) denotes the ﬁeld f of tuple t while
the expression store(t, i, v) denotes that tuple t at ﬁeld f has
the value v and all other tuple elements remain the same.
III. ESBMC
This section describes the main software components that
are integrated into the SMT-based back-end of CBMC and
the encoding techniques that we used to convert the con-
straints and properties from the ANSI-C embedded software
into the background theories of the SMT solvers.
A. SMT-based CBMC Back-End
Figure 1 shows the new back-end of CBMC in order
to support the SMT solvers CVC3, Boolector and Z3. The
gray boxes represent the components that we modiﬁed/in-
cluded in the back-end of CBMC. We reused the front-end
completely unchanged, i.e., we process the constraints and
properties that CBMC’s VCG generates for the unrolled C
program in single static assignment (SSA) form. However,
we implemented a new pair of encoding functions for each
supported SMT solver and let the user select between them.
The selected functions are then used to encode the given
constraints and properties into a global logical context,
using the background theories supported by the selected
SMT solver. Finally, we invoke this solver to check the
satisﬁability of the context formula.
BMC
Select 
SMT solver
convert contraints
convert properties
Logical 
Context
Interpret
counter-example
SMT
solver
Property 
holds up to 
bound k
Property 
violation
Figure 1. Overview of the SMT-based CBMC Back-end.
Formally, we build two sets of quantiﬁer-free formulae C
(for the constraints) and P (for the properties) such that
M |=kC∧¬P if and only if the property P holds in the
model M up to the bound k. If not, we have found a
violation of the property P. This approach can be used only
to ﬁnd violations of the property up to the bound k and not to
prove properties. For software veriﬁcation, in order to prove
properties we need to compute the completeness threshold to
determine the maximum number of loop-iterations occurring
in the program [15], [16]. However, in practice, complex
software programs involve large data-paths and complex ex-
pressions. Therefore, the resulting formulae become harder
to solve and require substantial amounts of memory to build.
Thus, for complex software programs, we can only ensure
that the property holds in M up to a bound k.
We use the code in Figure 2 as a running example
to illustrate the process of transforming a given ANSI-C
code into SSA form and after that into the quantiﬁer-free
formulae C and P (as shown in (1) and (2)). Note that
the code of Figure 2(a) is a syntactically valid C program,
but it accidentally writes to an address outside the allocated
memory region of the array a (line 6). In order to reason
about this C program, seven VCs are generated as follows:
the ﬁrst six VCs check the lower and upper bound of array
a in lines 4, 6 and 7 respectively and the last VC checks
the assert macro deﬁned by the user in line 7. However,
before actually checking the properties, the front-end of
CBMC performs a set of transformations and converts theprogram into SSA form. As a result, the original C program
in Figure 2(a) is then converted into SSA form that only
consists of if instructions, assignments and assertions as
s h o w ni nF i g u r e2 ( b ) .
1 int main() {
2 int a[2], i, x;
3 if (x==0)
4 a[i]=0;
5 else
6 a[i+2]=1;
7 assert(a[i+1]==1);
8 }
(a)
1 g1 == (x1 == 0)
2 a1 == ( a0 WITH [ i0 : = 0 ] )
3 a2 == a0
4 a3 == ( a2 WITH [2+ i0 : = 1 ] )
5 a4 == (g1 ? a1 : a3)
6 t1 == (a4[1+i0] == 1)
(b)
Figure 2. (a) A C program with violated property. (b) The C program of
(a) in SSA form.
C :=
⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
g1 := (x1 =0 )
∧ a1 := store(a0,i 0,0)
∧ a2 := a0
∧ a3 := store(a2,2+i0,1)
∧ a4 := ite(g1,a 1,a 3)
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
(1)
P :=
⎡
⎢ ⎢
⎣
i0 ≥ 0 ∧ i0 < 2
∧ 2+i0 ≥ 0 ∧ 2+i0 < 2
∧ 1+i0 ≥ 0 ∧ 1+i0 < 2
∧ select(a4,i 0 +1 )=1
⎤
⎥ ⎥
⎦ (2)
As we can see in Figure 2(b), for each assignment of the
form a = expr (i.e., lines 4 and 6 from Figure 2(a)), the
left-hand side variable is replaced by a new variable (i.e.,
a1 and a3). In addition, the if condition in line 3 is replaced
by a guard (i.e., g1), the array index i in lines 3, 6 and 7 is
replaced by i0 (note that the variable i is not modiﬁed in the
C program of Figure 2(a)) and the assert macro in line 7 is
replaced by a Boolean variable t1. After this transformation,
we build the constraints and properties formulae shown in
(1) and (2). The VCG of CBMC maps each veriﬁcation
condition to a Boolean variable. Consequently, we create
additional Boolean variables (called deﬁnition literals)f o r
each clause of the formula P in such a way that the deﬁnition
literal is true iff a given clause of the formula P is true.
Hence, in the example we add a constraint for each clause
of P as follows:
l0 ⇔ i0 ≥ 0
l1 ⇔ i0 < 2
···
l6 ⇔ select(a4,i 0 +1 )=1 (3)
We then rewrite (2) as:
¬P := ¬l0 ∨¬ l1 ∨ ...∨¬ l6 (4)
It is also important to point out that we simplify the formulae
C and P by using local and recursive transformations in
order to remove functionally redundant expressions and
redundant literals. Finally, the resulting formula C∧¬P is
passed to an SMT solver to check satisﬁability. In contrast,
Armando et al. [2], [5] build two sets of quantiﬁer-free
formulae C and P and check the validity C| =T
 
P using
an SMT solver. Moreover, they transform the C code into
conditional normal form as an intermediary step to encode
C and P while we encode them directly from the SSA form.
As mentioned in Section II-B, modern SMT solvers
provide ways to model the program variables as bit-vectors
or as elements of a numerical domain (e.g., Z, R). If the
program variables are modelled as bit-vectors of ﬁxed size,
then the result of the analysis can be precise (w.r.t. the ANSI-
C semantics), depending on the size considered for the bit-
vectors. On the other hand, if the program variables are
modelled as numerical values, then the result of the analysis
is independent from the actual binary representation, but the
analysis may not be precise when arithmetic expressions
are involved. For instance, the following formula is valid
in numerical domains such as Z or R:
(a>0 ∧ b>0) ⇒ (a + b>0) (5)
However, it does not hold if a and b are interpreted as bit-
vectors of ﬁxed-size, due to possible overﬂow in the addition
operation (Section III-C explains how we encode arithmetic
overﬂow). In our benchmarks, we noted that the majority of
VCs are solved faster if we model the basic datatypes as
integer and/or real. Therefore, we have to trade off speed
and accuracy, which might be two competing goals in
formal veriﬁcation using SMT solvers. Speed results from
the omission of detail in the original C program, whereas
accuracy results from the inclusion of detail. When encoding
the constraints and properties of C programs into SMT, we
allow the veriﬁcation engineer to decide the way to model
the basic data types (i.e., as integer/real values or as bit-
vectors) through a run-time option of ESBMC.
B. Code Optimizations
The ESBMC tool implements some standard code opti-
mization techniques such as constant folding and forward
substitution [17]. We observed that these optimization tech-
niques signiﬁcantly improve the performance of the tool over
a range of embedded software applications.
Constant folding, which is implemented in the front-
end, allows us to replace arithmetic operations involving
constants by other constants that represent the result of theoperation. Figure 3 shows an example of constant folding
when applied to the cyclic redundancy check algorithm
extracted from the Seoul National University Real-Time
(SNU-RT) benchmark [18].
1 for (j=0;j<=255;j++) {
2 icrctb[j]=icrc1(j<<8,(uchar)0);
3 rc[j]=(uchar)( it[j& 0xF]<<4 | it[j>>4]);
4 }
Figure 3. Code fragment of cyclic redundancy check.
The right-hand side of the assignments in line 2 and 3 are
replaced by the corresponding constants since the values of
the variable j and all elements of array it (where it is an array
of constants) are known at veriﬁcation time. As a result,
we can encode the expressions in line 2 and 3 by using
only the function store of the SMT solvers (note that the
function icrc1 receives two arguments and returns another
element of type unsigned char). We also observed that
there are several embedded applications that repeat the same
expression many times at different places. The value of the
operands in the expression does not change in between the
two evaluations of that expression and can thus be forward
substituted. Figure 4 shows a fragment of the Fast Fourier
Transform (FFT) algorithm, extracted again from the SNU-
RT benchmark [18], as an example of where the forward
substitution technique can be applied. This occurs because
the SSA representations of the two outermost for-loops
(in lines 6-15 and lines 8-14, respectively) will eventually
contain several copies of the innermost for-loop (lines 10-
13), and thus the right-hand side of the assignment in line
11 is repeated several times in the SSA form, depending on
the unwinding bound used to model check this program.
1 typedef struct {
2 float real , imag;
3 } complex;
4 int n=1024;
5 complex x[1024], ∗xi;
6 for(le= n/2; le>0; le /=2) {
7 ...
8 for (j=0; j<le ; j++) {
9 ...
10 for (i=j; i<n; i=i+2∗ le) {
11 xi = x + i;
12 ...
13 }
14 }
15 }
Figure 4. Code fragment of Fast Fourier Transformation.
In order to ensure that we have sufﬁciently unrolled all loops
of the FFT algorithm, we must set the unwinding bound k to
1024, because the upper bound n of the innermost for-loop
is equal to 1024 (see line 4). As a result, the for-loop in lines
6-15 will contain nine copies of the the for-loop in lines 8-
14, and the variable le will assume the values 512, 256, 128,
..., 1. Consequently, the expression x+ithat is assigned
to the xi pointer index is repeated many times, due to the
halting conditions j<le and i<nof the for-loops in lines
8 and 10 respectively. We thus include all expressions into
a cache so that when a given expression is processed again
in the program, we only retrieve it from the cache instead
of creating a new set of variables.
C. Encodings
1) Scalar Data Types: We provide two approaches to
model unsigned and signed integer data types, either as the
integers provided by the corresponding SMT-lib theories or
as bit-vectors, which are encoded using a particular bit width
such as 32 bits. The relational operators (e.g., <, ≤, >,
≥), arithmetic operators (e.g., +, −, /, ∗, rem) and right-
shift are encoded depending on whether the operands are
unsigned or signed bit-vectors, integer or real numbers. We
support all type casts, including conversion between integer
and ﬂoating-point types. From the front-end’s point of view,
there are six scalar datatypes: bool, signedbv, unsignedbv,
ﬁxedbv, ﬂoatbv and pointer. At this point in time, we only
support ﬁxed-point arithmetic (i.e., ﬁxedbv)f o rdouble and
ﬂoat instead of ﬂoating-point arithmetic (i.e., ﬂoatbv).
The ANSI-C datatypes int, long int, long long int, char are
considered as signedbv with different bit width (depending
on the machine architecture) and the unsigned version of
these datatypes are considered as unsignedbv. The conver-
sions between signedbv, unsignedbv and ﬁxedbv are per-
formed using the world-level functions Extracti,j, SignExtk
and ZeroExtk described in Section II-B. Similarly, upon
dereferencing, the object that the pointer points to is con-
verted using the same word-level functions. The datatype
bool is converted into signedbv and unsignedbv using ite.
In addition, signedbv and unsignedbv are converted into
bool using the operator  = by comparing the variable to be
converted with zero. Formally, let v be a variable of signed
type, k be a constant whose value represents zero in the type
of v and let t be a boolean variable such that t ∈{ 0,1}.W e
then convert v into t as follows:
t =
 
v = k → 0,
v  = k → 1 (6)
2) Arithmetic Overﬂow and Underﬂow: Arithmetic over-
ﬂow and underﬂow are frequent sources of bugs in embed-
ded software. ANSI-C, like most programming languages,
provides basic data types that have a bounded range de-
ﬁned by the number of bits allocated to each of them.
Some model checkers (e.g., SMT-CBMC [2], F-Soft [3]
and Blast [19]) treat program variables either as unbounded
integers or they do not generate VCs related to arithmetic
overﬂow and consequently can produce false positive resultswhen a VC cannot violate the boundary condition. In our
work, we encode VCs related to arithmetic overﬂow and
underﬂow following the ANSI-C standard. This requires
that, on arithmetic overﬂow of unsigned integer types (e.g.,
unsigned int, unsigned long int), the result must be encoded
as modulo (i.e., rm o d2w, where r is the operation that
caused overﬂow and w is the width of the resulting type in
terms of bits) [7]. Hence, the result of this encoding is one
greater than the largest value that can be represented by the
resulting type. This semantics can easily be encoded using
the background theories of the SMT solvers.
On the other hand, the ANSI-C standard does not deﬁne
any behaviour on arithmetic overﬂow of signed types (e.g.,
int, long int), and only states that integer division-by-zero
must be detected. As a result, we consider arithmetic over-
ﬂow on addition, subtraction, multiplication, division and
negation operations. Formally, let overﬂow
∗(x,y) denote
a literal that is true if and only if the multiplication of x
and y is over LONG MAX and let underﬂow
∗(x,y) denote
another literal that is true if and only if the multiplication
of x and y is under LONG MIN. Let res op∗ be a literal
that denotes the validity of the signed multiplication. Then,
we add the following constraint:
res op∗ ⇔¬ overﬂow
∗(x,y) ∧¬ underﬂow
∗(x,y)
The addition, subtraction and division are encoded
in a similar way and are denoted by overﬂow
+,
underﬂow
+, overﬂow
−, underﬂow
−, overﬂow
/.T h e
function overﬂow
∼(x) takes only one argument and returns
true if and only if the negation of x is outside the interval
given by LONG MIN and LONG MAX.
3) Arrays: Arrays are encoded in a straight-forward man-
ner using the domain theories, and we consider the WITH
operator and index operator []to be part of the encoding [8],
[20]. These operators are mapped to the functions store
and select of the array theory presented in Section II-B
respectively. For the WITH operator, let a be an array, i
be an integer variable, and v be an expression with the type
of the elements in a. The operator with takes a, i, and v and
returns an array that is exactly the same as array a except
that the value at index position i is v (if i is within the array
bounds). Formally, let a  be aw i t h[i]: =v, and j an index
of a, then:
a  [j]=
 
i = j → v,
i  = j → a[j] (7)
If an array index operation is out of bounds, the value
of the index operator is a free variable, i.e., it is chosen
non-deterministically.
4) Structures and Unions: Structures and unions are
encoded using the theory of tuples in SMT and we map
update and access operations to the functions store and
select of the theory of tuples presented in Section II-B. We
describe only the encoding process for structures, but unions
are encoded in a similar way. Let w be a structure type, f
be a ﬁeld name of this structure, and v be an expression
matching the type of the ﬁeld f. The expression store takes
w, f, and v and returns a tuple that is exactly the same as
tuple w except that the value at ﬁeld f is v and all other tuple
elements remain the same. Formally, let w  be store(w,f,v)
and j be a ﬁeld name of w, then:
w .j =
 
j = f → v,
j  = f → w.j (8)
5) Pointers: The ANSI-C language offers two dereferenc-
ing operators ∗p and p[i], where p denotes a pointer (or ar-
ray) and i denotes an integer index. The front-end of CBMC
removes all pointer dereferences bottom-up during the un-
winding phase. Therefore, the ANSI-C pointers are treated
as program variables and CBMC’s VCG generates two
properties related to pointer safety: (i) check that the pointer
points to a correct object (represented by SAME OBJECT)
and (ii) check that the pointer is neither NULL nor an invalid
object (represented by INVALID POINTER).
We thus encode pointers using two ﬁelds of a tuple. Let
p denote the tuple which encodes a pointer type expression.
The ﬁrst ﬁeld p.o, encodes the object the pointer points
to, while the second ﬁeld p.i, encodes an index within that
object. It is important to note that in our encoding the ﬁeld
p.o is dynamically adjusted in order to accommodate the
object that the pointer points to. This approach is similar
to the encoding of CBMC into propositional logic, but we
use the background theories such as tuples and bit-vector
arithmetic while CBMC encodes them by concatenating the
bit-vectors.
Formally, let pa be a pointer expression that points to the
object a and pb be another pointer expression that points to
the object b.L e tls be a literal and we then encode the prop-
erty SAME OBJECT by adding the following constraint:
ls ⇔ (pa.o = pb.o) (9)
To check invalid pointers, the NULL pointer is then
encoded with an unique identiﬁer denoted by η and invalid
object is denoted by ν.L e tp denote a pointer expression.
Hence we encode the property INVALID POINTER by
creating a literal li and adding the following constraint:
li ⇔ (p.o  = ν) ∧ (p.i  = η) (10)
It is important to note that in the case that a pointer points
to single element of a scalar data type (e.g., int, char),
then p.i consists of 0 only. However, in case of an array
consisting of elements of a scalar data type, p.i is considered
to be equal to the array index. As an example to explain
our encoding, we modiﬁed the C program of Figure 2(a) so
that a pointer p points to the array a as shown in line 3 of
Figure 5. In addition to the constraints and properties shown
in (1) and (2) (see Section III-A), the front-end generates one
additional constraint (i.e., the front-end treats the assignmentp=a in line 3 as p=&a[0]) and one additional VC (i.e.,
SAME OBJECT(p, &a[0])) for the C program of Figure 5.
The constraint p=&a[0] is encoded as follows: the ﬁrst
element of the tuple (p.o) contains the array a and the second
element (p.i) contains the index whose value is equal to 0.
In order to check the property speciﬁed by the assert macro
i nl i n e8 ,w eﬁ r s ta d dt h ev a l u e2t op.i and then check
whether p and a point to the same element. As p.i exceeds
the size of the object stored in p.o, i.e., array a, then the
VC is violated and thus the assert macro deﬁned in line 8
is false.
1 int main() {
2 int a[2], i, x, ∗p;
3 p=a;
4 if (x==0)
5 a[i]=0;
6 else
7 a[i+2]=1;
8 assert(∗(p+2)==1);
9 }
Figure 5. C program with pointer to an array.
Structures consisting of n ﬁelds with scalar data types
are also manipulated like an array with n elements. This
means that the front-end of CBMC allows us to encode the
structures by using the usual update and access operations. If
the structure contains arrays, pointers and scalar data types,
then p.i points to the object within the structure only. As an
example, Figure 6 shows a C program that contains a pointer
to a struct consisting of two ﬁelds (an array a of integer and
a char variable b). In order to reason about this C program,
the front-end generates the constraints and properties and
we then encode and pass the resulting formulae to the SMT
solvers as C∧¬P as shown in (11) and (12).
As the struct y is declared as global in Figure 6 (see lines
1-4), its members must be initialized before performing any
operation [7], as shown in the ﬁrst two lines of (11). The
assignment p =& y (see line 7 of Figure 6) is encoded by
assigning the structure y to the ﬁeld p1.o and the value 0 to
the ﬁeld p1.i. However, the front-end does not generate any
VC related to pointer safety since there is no violation of
the pointer p in the C program of Figure 6 (i.e., the pointer
p points to the correct object). As a result, the front-end
performs static checking and does not generate unnecessary
VCs. Thus, the pointer p represented by the tuple p1 is not
used for reasoning about this program.
C :=
⎡
⎢ ⎢
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
y0.b := 0
∧ y1 := store(store(y0.a,0,0),1,0)
∧ p1.o := y ∧ p1.i := 0
∧ y2 := store(y1,a,store(y1.a,0,0))
∧ y3 := store(y2,a,store(y2.a,1,1))
∧ y4 := store(y3,b,99)
⎤
⎥ ⎥
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
(11)
1 struct x {
2 int a[2];
3 char b;
4 } y;
5 int main(void) {
6 struct x ∗p;
7 p=&y ;
8 p−>a[1]=1;
9 p−>b=’c’;
10 assert(p −>a[1]==1);
11 assert(p −>b==’c’ );
12 }
Figure 6. C program with pointer to a struct.
P :=
 
select(select(y4,a),1) = 1
∧ select(y4,b)=9 9
 
(12)
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
The experimental evaluation of our work consists of
three parts. The ﬁrst part in Section IV-A contains the
results of applying ESBMC to the veriﬁcation of ﬁfteen
ANSI-C programs using three different SMT solvers CVC3,
Boolector and Z3. The purpose of this ﬁrst part is to identify
the most promising SMT solver for further development and
experiments. CVC3, Boolector and Z3 are well suited for the
purpose that they were written for, and our intention is to
integrate all of them into the back-end of CBMC, but ﬁrstly
we need to prioritize the tasks.
The second part, described in Section IV-B, contains
the results of applying ESBMC and SMT-CBMC to the
benchmark suite of the SMT-CBMC model checker. The
purpose of this second part is to evaluate ESBMC’s per-
formance relative to SMT-CBMC’s performance. We use
the SMT-CBMC’s benchmark suite, because it does not
support some of the ANSI-C constructs commonly found
in embedded software (e.g., bit operations, ﬂoating-point
arithmetic, pointer arithmetic).
The third part in Section IV-C contains the experimental
results of applying CBMC and ESBMC to the veriﬁcation
of embedded software used in telecommunications, control
systems, and medical devices. The purpose of this third part
is to evaluate ESBMC’s relative performance against CBMC
using standard embedded software benchmarks.
All experiments were conducted on an otherwise idle Intel
Xeon 5160, 3GHz server with 4 GB of RAM running Linux
OS. For all benchmarks, the time limit has been set to 3600
seconds for each individual property. All times given are
wall clock time in seconds as measured by the unix time
command through a single execution.
A. Comparison of SMT solvers
As a ﬁrst step, we analyzed to which extent the SMT
solvers support the domain theories that are required for
SMT-based BMC of ANSI-C programs. For this purpose,we analyzed the following versions of the SMT solvers:
CVC3 (1.5), Boolector (1.0) and Z3 (2.0). For the theory
of linear and non-linear arithmetic, Z3 and CVC3 do not
support the remainder operator, but they allow us to deﬁne
axioms to support it. Currently, Boolector does not support
the theory of linear and non-linear arithmetic. In the theory
of bit-vectors, CVC3 does not support the division and
remainder operators (/, rem) for bit-vectors representing
signed and unsigned integers. However, in all cases, axioms
can be speciﬁed in order to improve the coverage. Z3
and Boolector support all word-level, bit-level, relational,
arithmetic functions over unsigned and signed bit-vectors. In
the theories of arrays and tuples, the veriﬁcation problems
only involve selecting and storing elements from/into arrays
and tuples, respectively, and both domains thus comprise
only two operations. These operations are fully supported
by CVC3 and Z3, but Boolector does not support the theory
of tuples.
In order to evaluate the SMT solvers, we used a number
of ANSI-C programs taken from standard benchmark suites.
The results of this ﬁrst part are shown in Table I. The
ﬁrst seven programs are taken from the benchmark suite
of the SMT-CBMC model checker [2]. These programs
depend on a positive integer N that deﬁnes the size of
the arrays in the programs and/or the number of iterations
done by the program. Armando et al. already showed that
this class of programs allows us to assess the scalability
of the model checking tools on problems of increasing
complexity [2]. The next four programs are taken from
the SNU-RT benchmarks suite [18]. These programs imple-
ment the insertion sort algorithm, Fibonacci function, binary
search algorithm and the least mean-square (LMS) adaptive
signal enhancement. Program 9 is taken from the MiBench
benchmark and implements the root computation of cubic
equations. Program 10 is taken from the CBMC manual [8]
and implements the multiplication of two numbers using bit
operations. The last two programs are taken from the High
Level Synthesis benchmarks suite [21] and implement the
encoder and decoder of the adaptive differential pulse code
modulation (ADPCM). The C programs from 8 to 15 contain
typical ANSI-C constructs found in embedded software, i.e.,
they contain linear and non-linear arithmetic and make heavy
use of bit operations.
Table I shows the results of the comparison between
CVC3, Boolector and Z3. The ﬁrst column #Lg i v e st h e
total number of lines of code, the second column B gives
the unwinding bound while the third column #Pg i v e s
the number of properties to be veriﬁed for each ANSI-C
program. Size gives the total number of variables that are
needed to encode the constraints and properties of the ANSI-
C programs. Time provides the average time in seconds to
check all properties of a given ANSI-C program and Failed
indicates how many properties failed during the veriﬁcation
process. Here, properties can fail for two reasons: either
ESBMC SMT-CBMC
Module B Z3 CVC3 CVC3
BubbleSort 35 2.03 28.27 94.5
140 163.15 MO ∗
SelectionSort 35 0.83 8.48 66.52
140 74.36 MO MO
BellmanFord 20 0.30 0.45 13.62
Prim 8 0.48 16.88 18.36
StrCmp 1000 38.75 9.88 TO
SumArray 1000 4.74 1.22 113.8
MinMax 1000 6.22 MO MO
Table II
RESULTS OF THE COMPARISON BETWEEN ESBMC AND SMT-CBMC.
due to a time out (TO) or due to memory out (MO). As
we can see in Table I, Z3 usually runs slightly faster than
Boolector and CVC3. However, it is not always the fastest
solver: CVC3 runs faster than Z3 and Boolector for StrCmp
and Boolector runs slightly faster than Z3 and CVC3 for
SumArray. As is often the case, the performance comparison
of the SMT solvers thus remains somewhat inconclusive,
because it usually depends on the particular benchmarks.
However, since the purpose of this evaluation was only to
prioritize the integration of the SMT solvers into the back-
end of CBMC and not to identify the best SMT solver.
we chose to continue the development with Z3, which also
supports most of the occurring operations.
B. Comparison to SMT-CBMC
This subsection describes the evaluation of ESBMC
against another SMT-based BMC that was developed in [2],
[5]. In order to carry out this evaluation, we took the ofﬁcial
benchmark of SMT-CBMC tool available at [22]. SMT-
CBMC has been invoked by setting manually the ﬁle name
and the unwinding bound (i.e., SMT-CBMC -file name
-bound n). Furthermore, we used the default solver of
SMT-CBMC (i.e, CVC3 1.5) against the default solver of
ESBMC (i.e., Z3 2.0) as well as ESBMC connected to CVC3
1.5. Table II shows the results of this evaluation.
If CVC3 is used as SMT solver, both tools run out
of memory (although only after exceeding the time out)
or fail with an internal error (represented by ∗) and thus
fail to analyze BubbleSort and SelectionSort for large N
(N=140), and MinMax. This indicates some problems in the
solver itself, rather than in veriﬁcation tools. In addition,
SMT-CBMC runs out of time when analyzing the program
StrCmp. If Z3 is used as solver for ESBMC, the difference
between both tools becomes more noticeable and ESBMC
generally outperforms SMT-CBMC by a factor of 20-40.
C. Comparison to CBMC
In order to evaluate ESBMC’s performance relative to
CBMC, we analyzed different benchmarks such as SNU-CVC3 Boolector Z3
Module #L B #P Size Time Failed Size Time Failed Size Time Failed
1 BubbleSort 43 35 17 9031 28.27 0 3011 1.94 0 6057 2.03 0
43 140 17 146371 MO 1 48791 182.67 0 97722 163.15 0
2 SelectionSort 34 35 17 6982 8.48 0 1955 0.78 0 5134 0.83 0
34 140 17 108832 MO 1 29885 74.59 0 79369 74.36 0
3 BellmanFord 49 20 33 1076 0.45 0 326 0.27 0 656 0.3 0
4 Prim 79 8 30 4008 16.88 0 1296 0.5 0 3017 0.48 0
5 StrCmp 14 1000 6 9005 9.88 0 3003 91.145 0 7006 38.75 0
6 SumArray 12 1000 7 3001 1.22 0 1001 0.93 0 2003 4.74 0
7 MinMax 19 1000 9 17989 MO 1 5997 947.58 0 11994 6.22 0
8 InsertionSort 86 35 17 9337 35.57 0 3113 2.37 0 6328 2.51 0
86 140 17 147622 MO 1 49208 TO 1 98833 143 0
9 Fibonacci 83 15 4 16 15.12 0 16 15.6 0 16 15.2 0
10 bs 95 15 7 17 0.21 0 17 0.02 0 17 0.02 0
11 lms 258 202 23 14810 1011.92 0 5005 138.74 0 10211 138.6 0
12 Cubic 66 5 5 40 0.01 0 20 0.19 0 33 0.2 0
13 BitWise 18 8 1 77 272.38 0 27 7.51 0 53 28.37 0
14 adpcm encode 149 41 12 6417 211.81 0 2377 738.86 0 4878 5.49 0
15 adpcm decode 111 41 10 23885 43.77 0 9121 20.16 0 19270 14.31 0
Table I
RESULTS OF THE COMPARISON BETWEEN CVC3, BOOLECTOR AND Z3. TIME-OUTS ARE REPRESENTED WITH TO IN THE TIME COLUMN;E XAMPLES
THAT EXCEED AVAILABLE MEMORY ARE REPRESENTED WITH MO IN THE TIME COLUMN.
RT [18], PowerStone [23], NEC [24] and NXP [25]. The
SNU-RT benchmarks contain ANSI-C programs that imple-
ment cyclic redundancy check, Fast Fourier Transform, LMS
adaptive signal enhancement, JPEG, matrix multiplication,
LU decomposition and root computation of quadratic equa-
tions. The PowerStone benchmarks contain graphics applica-
tions, ADPCM encoder and decoder, paging communication
protocols and bit shifting applications. The NEC benchmark
contains an implementation of the Laplace transform. The
NXP benchmarks are taken from the set-top box of NXP
semiconductors that is used in high deﬁnition internet pro-
tocol (IP) and hybrid digital TV (DTV) applications. The
embedded software of this platform relies on the Linux
operating system and makes use of different applications
such as (i) LinuxDVB that is responsible for controlling
the front-end, tuners and multiplexers, (ii) DirectFB that
provides graphics applications and input device handling and
(iii) ALSA that is used to control the audio applications. This
platform contains two embedded processors that exchange
messages via an inter-process communication (IPC) mecha-
nism.
We evaluated CBMC version 2.9 and we invoked both
tools (i.e., CBMC and ESBMC) by setting manually the ﬁle
name, the unwinding bound and the overﬂow check (i.e.,
CBMC file --unwind n --overflow-check). Ta-
ble III shows the results when applying CBMC and ESBMC
to the veriﬁcation of the embedded software benchmarks.
As we can see in Table III, CBMC is not able to check the
programs fft1k and lms due to memory limitations. More-
over, CBMC takes considerably more time than ESBMC
to model check the programs ludcmp, qurt and laplace.I n
addition, ESBMC runs faster than CBMC for the programs
adpcm, exStbHDMI and exStbLED. The only case where
CBMC runs faster than ESBMC is exStbResolution.F o rt h e
remaining benchmarks, the veriﬁcation times of ESBMC
and CBMC are very close. It is important to point out that
the encoding time of ESBMC, for all analyzed programs,
is slightly faster than the encoding time of CBMC. The
results in Table III allow us to assess quantitatively that
ESBMC scales signiﬁcantly better than CBMC for problems
that involve tight interplay between non-linear arithmetic, bit
operations, pointers and array manipulations. In addition,
both tools were able to ﬁnd undiscovered bugs related to
arithmetic overﬂow, invalid pointer and pointer arithmetic
in the programs jfdctint, blit and pocsag respectively.
V. RELATED WORK
SMT-based BMC is gaining popularity in the formal
veriﬁcation community due to the advent of sophisticated
SMT solvers built over efﬁcient SAT solvers [11], [12],
[13]. Previous work related to SMT-based BMC [2], [3],
[4], [5] combined decision procedures for the theories of
uninterpreted functions, arrays and linear arithmetic only, but
did not encode key constructs of the ANSI-C programming
language such as bit operations, ﬂoating-point arithmetic and
pointers. Ganai and Gupta describe a veriﬁcation frameworkCBMC ESBMC
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1 sensor 603 5 167 2.04 0.002 2.04 167 0 0 1.23 0.02 1.26 167 0 0
2 crc 125 257 18 5.60 0.003 5.60 18 0 0 4.08 0.07 4.16 18 0 0
3 fft1 218 9 72 0.44 0.001 0.44 72 0 0 0.43 0.005 0.43 72 0 0
4 fft1k 155 1025 39 MO MO MO 0 0 39 2337.83 0.055 2337.88 39 0 0
5 ﬁbcall 83 30 2 0.19 0 0.19 2 0 0 0.15 0.002 0.15 2 0 0
6 ﬁr 314 34 25 4.88 0.02 4.9 25 0 0 3.36 0.68 4.04 25 0 0
7 insertsort 86 10 17 0.36 0.005 0.37 17 0 0 0.31 0.02 0.32 17 0 0
8 jfdctint 374 65 331 1.22 0.001 1.22 330 1 0 0.45 2.41 2.86 330 1 0
9 lms 258 202 35 MO MO MO 0 0 35 132.6 0.24 132.84 35 0 0
10 ludcmp 144 7 88 4.52 TO TO 87 0 1 0.017 1.44 1.46 88 0 0
11 matmul 81 6 31 1.16 0 1.16 31 0 0 1.06 0.012 1.07 31 0 0
12 qurt 164 20 8 18.83 TO TO 7 0 1 1.22 7.7 8.92 8 0 0
13 bcnt 86 17 162 4.42 0.05 4.47 162 0 0 1.24 0.89 2.13 162 0 0
14 blit 95 1 129 0.21 0.001 0.21 128 1 0 0.13 0.28 0.41 128 1 0
15 pocsag 521 42 183 15.32 0.1 15.42 182 1 0 12.33 5.77 18.1 182 1 0
16 adpcm 473 100 553 74.34 3.52 77.86 553 0 0 45.73 9.24 54.97 553 0 0
17 laplace 110 11 76 30.81 TO TO 0 0 76 12.32 0.29 12.62 76 0 0
18 exStbKey 558 20 18 1.23 0.002 1.23 18 0 0 1.22 0.004 1.23 18 0 0
19 exStbHDMI 1045 15 25 167.91 78.97 246.88 25 0 0 164.43 33.53 197.96 25 0 0
20 exStbLED 430 40 6 195.97 129.8 325.77 6 0 0 165.63 44.53 210.16 6 0 0
21 exStbHwAcc 1432 1000 113 0.67 0.002 0.67 113 0 0 0.72 0.004 0.73 113 0 0
22 exStbResolution 353 200 40 271.8 319.13 590.93 40 0 0 269.31 1161.16 1430.47 40 0 0
Table III
RESULTS OF THE COMPARISON BETWEEN CBMC AND ESBMC
for BMC which extracts high-level design information from
an extended ﬁnite state machine (EFSM) and applies several
techniques to simplify the BMC problem [3], [15]. However,
the authors ﬂatten structures and arrays into scalar variables
in such a way that they use only the theory of integer and
real arithmetic in order to solve the veriﬁcation problems
that come out in BMC.
Armando et al. also propose a BMC approach using SMT
solvers for C programs [2], [5]. However, they only make
use of linear arithmetic (i.e., addition and multiplication by
constants), arrays, records and bit-vectors in order to solve
the veriﬁcation problems. As a consequence, their SMT-
CBMC prototype does not address important constructs
of the ANSI-C programming language such as non-linear
arithmetic and bit-shift operations. Xu proposes the use
of SMT-based BMC to verify real-time systems by using
TCTL to specify the properties [4]. The author considers an
informal speciﬁcation (written in English) of the real-time
system and then models the variables using integers and reals
and represents the clock constraints using linear arithmetic
expressions.
De Moura et al. present a bounded model checker that
combines propositional SAT solvers with domain-speciﬁc
theorem provers over inﬁnite domains [26]. Differently from
other related work, the authors abstract the Boolean formula
and then apply a lazy approach to reﬁne it in an incremental
way. This approach is applied to verify timed automata and
RTL level descriptions. Jackson et al. [27] discharge several
veriﬁcation conditions from programs written in the Spark
language to the SMT solvers CVC3 and Yices as well as
to the theorem prover Simplify. The idea of this work is to
replace the Praxis prover by CVC3, Yices and Simplify in
order to generate counter-example witnesses to veriﬁcation
conditions that are not valid. This is an ongoing project and
several improvements are planned to be integrated into their
tool.
Recently, a number of static checkers have been developed
in order to trade off scalability and precision. Calysto is an
efﬁcient static checker that is able to verify VCs related to
arithmetic overﬂow, null-pointer dereferences and assertions
speciﬁed by the user [28]. The VCs are passed to the
SMT solver SPEAR which supports boolean logic, bit-vector arithmetic and is highly customized for the VCs
generated by Calysto. However, Calysto does not support
ﬂoat-point operations and unsoundly approximates loops by
unrolling them only once. As a consequence, soundness
is relinquished for performance. Saturn is another efﬁcient
static checker that scales to larger systems, but with the
drawback of losing precision by supporting only the most
common integer operators and performing at most two
unwindings of each loop [29].
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have investigated SMT-based veriﬁcation
of ANSI-C programs, in particular embedded software. We
have described a new set of encodings that allow us to
reason accurately about bit operations, unions, ﬂoat-point
arithmetic, pointers and pointer arithmetic and we have
also improved the performance of SMT-based BMC for
embedded software by making use of high-level information
to simplify the unrolled formula. Our experiments constitute,
to the best of our knowledge, the ﬁrst substantial evaluation
of this approach over industrial applications. The results
show that our approach outperforms CBMC [8] and SMT-
CBMC [2] if we consider the veriﬁcation of embedded
software. SMT-CBMC still has limitations not only in the
veriﬁcation time (due to the lack of simpliﬁcation based
on high-level information), but also in the encodings of
important ANSI-C constructs used in embedded software.
CBMC is a bounded model checker for full ANSI-C, but
it has limitations due to the fact that the size of the propo-
sitional formulae increases signiﬁcantly in the presence of
large data-paths and high-level information is lost when the
veriﬁcation conditions are converted into propositional logic
(preventing potential optimizations to reduce the state space
to be explored). For future work, we intend to investigate
the application of termination analysis [30] and incorporate
reduction methods to simplify the k-model.
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